{"id":986,"date":"2021-02-22T15:24:45","date_gmt":"2021-02-22T21:24:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/wordpress\/almostclassical\/?p=986"},"modified":"2025-01-09T22:07:39","modified_gmt":"2025-01-10T04:07:39","slug":"valentines-freeze-of-2021-texas-as-a-cautionary-tale","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/2021\/02\/22\/valentines-freeze-of-2021-texas-as-a-cautionary-tale\/","title":{"rendered":"Valentine&rsquo;s Freeze of 2021: Texas as a Cautionary Tale"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Public and private failures have struck both California\u2019s and Texas\u2019 power grids in recent years. Why is this? Is this a failure of the marketplace, of public utility commissions, of capitalism, or of our elected officials?<\/p>\n<p>Many failures combined, along with a series of events, to cause the Valentine\u2019s Freeze of 2021 in Texas.<\/p>\n<p>Cascading failures also resulted in power outages in California.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Why does this happen across the United States? Why do our public and private infrastructure projects keep failing?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The difficult truth for ideologues is that power generation and distribution have failed in very different states, and within those states in very different local jurisdictions.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Austin_Energy\">City of Austin owns Austin Energy<\/a>. It\u2019s not a private company. It operates as a public utility, yet had some of the worst production failures. This isn&#8217;t an example of privatization gone wrong, at least not throughout Texas. Nor are California\u2019s problems ideologically based.<\/p>\n<p>We can argue about energy markets, regulation, and the best balance between affordability and reliability. We have come to expect, unreasonably, perfect reliability from everything in our lives. We\u2019re living at a time when electricity and water tend to be readily available. We have high expectations, even as utilities regularly meet 99 percent up-time standards. We want 99.99 percent reliability.<\/p>\n<p>How much would another 0.1 or 0.01 percent reliability cost? Is that cost justified? And do people understand perfect is impossible?<\/p>\n<p>I want an open energy market and segmented grid. Regulations are not \u201csocialism\u201d or \u201ccommunism\u201d and open markets need not descend into crony capitalism or corporatism.<\/p>\n<p>As a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/wordpress\/almostclassical\/2018\/02\/08\/the-academic-libertarian-left-exists-and-should-be-read\/\">libertarian-left<\/a>\u201d classical liberal, I believe natural resources are \u201cowned\u201d by nobody and serve the common good. You can own the intellectual property that converts the resources. You can and should be rewarded for innovation when it comes to the production and distribution of resources that might not otherwise be possible. However, in the end, nobody should be able to \u201cown\u201d water, gas, oil fields, et cetera. Thankfully, nobody is trying to own the sun or wind.<\/p>\n<p>Returning to Texas and California, they are trying different models of production and distribution and both have a history of failing the public good. Worse, the systems have led to property destruction and the loss of life.<\/p>\n<p>Slogans and memes don\u2019t reflect the nuance of our economy or our public infrastructure. We rely on a public-private hybrid model for most utility services in the United States. Curiously, in most of Europe, utilities are privatized, so it\u2019s not a uniquely \u201cAmerican\u201d hybrid model.<\/p>\n<p>What failed wasn\u2019t Texas or California; it\u2019s not as simple as \u201cRed State\u201d or \u201cBlue State\u201d philosophies.<\/p>\n<h3>ERCOT and the Public Utility Commission of Texas<\/h3>\n<p>There\u2019s some confusion claiming Texas power is all privatized. ERCOT is not quite a state agency, but it is a Government Sponsored Enterprise and 501(c)4. ERCOT reports to the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT). ERCOT uses some of the latest technology available as it manages the flow of electric power to more than 26 million Texas customers, representing about 90 percent of the state.<\/p>\n<p>The ERCOT board, in theory, includes representatives from academia, consumer groups, and energy companies. The organization is funded by membership fees paid by the power suppliers. (Many state and federal agencies are also supported by fees collected by regulated industries.) The structure of the ERCOT board was intended to keep it independent, but that\u2019s never easy.<\/p>\n<p>Quick example: The Federal Aviation Administration needs to employ aviation experts. Most of those experts have worked or will work within the aviation industry. Likewise, ERCOT board members end up being energy experts who have or will work within private energy companies and non-profit energy advocacy groups.<\/p>\n<p>ERCOT is mandated by state law to balance \u201clowest reasonable cost\u201d with 99% reliability. The state legislature has long held that low energy prices help attract businesses to Texas and employ its residents. We can debate if that\u2019s politicians putting businesses ahead of voters, but the voters keep returning these officials to Austin.<\/p>\n<p>The energy grid in Texas is not an example of deregulation. It is not libertarian. It is a state system with a mandate to emphasize price and a reliability threshold.<\/p>\n<p>It failed, yes, but not because it\u2019s private or some Wild West or Ayn Rand creation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>It failed because they didn\u2019t plan for cold weather after 2011\u2019s failure.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Notably, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.texasmonthly.com\/news\/el-paso-electric-winter-storm-2021\/\">El Paso did fine<\/a> during the Valentine\u2019s Freeze. After experiencing devastating problems in 2011, El Paso\u2019s leaders received voter support to harden their local electricity grid and power stations. The voters understood the need\u2026 after a disaster. El Paso is also connected to the Western Grid, offering extra security when local generation fails.<\/p>\n<p>Weather won in Austin, a progressive city that even <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kxan.com\/investigations\/austins-biomass-power-plant-sat-idle-during-texas-winter-energy-crisis\/\">owns a power plant<\/a>. Austin\u2019s plant was offline.<\/p>\n<p>People might know this, but Austin owns a power plant. To save money, the city leaders opted to use the plant seasonally, during summers, because that\u2019s when Texans use the most electricity. Power plants cannot be turned on or off quickly, so Austin was unable to activate its biomass plant during the freeze.<\/p>\n<h3>National Infrastructure Neglect<\/h3>\n<p>The American Society of Civil Engineers monitors the infrastructure of the United States.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.infrastructurereportcard.org\">ASCE Infrastructure Report Card<\/a>\u00a0was last revised in 2019, when our national grade was D+. At that time, our national infrastructure needed an estimated $4.5 trillion in repairs, upgrades, and general maintenance.<\/p>\n<p>Our infrastructure is crumbling, and we know it. But, voters don\u2019t want to do anything about the problem and politicians prefer new projects over fixing what already exists.<\/p>\n<p>State reports are updated on a rotating basis. In 2021\u2019s ASCE reported that Texas earned a C, barely surpassing California\u2019s most recent grade of C-. In other words, our two largest states, despite their political differences, are both in serious trouble.<\/p>\n<p>Years of neglect will now require the complete replacement of some infrastructure. If you don\u2019t maintain a system, it rots.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s bad enough that we, as citizens of states and the nation, have allowed the infrastructure to rot. Yes, I place the blame squarely on voters. Even if 49 percent supported spending on maintenance (which is not the case), a majority of local and state voters keep rejecting infrastructure bonds. They will often approve new projects on the same ballot rejecting maintenance expenses.<\/p>\n<p>National politicians also favor shiny new projects, like high-speed rail, over fixing water pipes and power grids.<\/p>\n<p>And then, there\u2019s the weather. The climate is changing, and why it is changing matters less than how we adapt.<\/p>\n<h3>Weather vs. Infrastructure<\/h3>\n<p>Natural forces destroy things. Watch a few episodes of\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Life_After_People\"><em>Life After People<\/em><\/a>\u00a0or browse \u201curban decay\u201d photos on the Internet. Nature tears apart anything humans build. Some structures last longer than others. Sadly, we aren\u2019t building pyramids or Roman aqueducts.<\/p>\n<p>The weather in Texas, California, and elsewhere is changing. Our yard features native and adapted plants considered ideal for Central Texas. It looks like several of them died in the freeze. The summers are warmer, the winters are colder. Plants are rated for ranges of temperatures, not extremes. Yet, extremes are what we\u2019re having.<\/p>\n<p>Engineers are now trying to explain that you can harden energy production for either extreme hot or extreme cold, but not always both. That means some systems will fail, at least until we can find cost-effective solutions that work from -15 degrees through 115 degrees\u00a0 Fahrenheit. That\u2019s quite a range to manage.\u00a0Record heatwaves and record cold snaps cause extreme changes to materials. Water expands as ice, cracking pipes. Other liquids might also freeze, as my wife and I learned in Minnesota. Even \u201cice melt\u201d chemicals stop working at some point. In the heat, other things go wrong.<\/p>\n<p>As Politico reporters noted this week, weather wins in both California and Texas, no matter who runs the power grids or what the regulators might try to mandate.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Politico.com<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2021\/02\/21\/texas-california-climate-change-power-grids-470434\">Texas and California built different power grids, but neither stood up to climate change<\/a><\/p>\n<p>By ERIC WOLFF, DEBRA KAHN and ZACK COLMAN<br \/>\n02\/21\/2021 07:00 AM EST<\/p>\n<p>Texas and California may be worlds apart in their politics and climate policies, but they have something in common: Extreme weather crashed their power grids and left people stranded in the dark.<\/p>\n<p>The two sprawling, politically potent states have devoted massive sums to their power networks over the past two decades \u2014 California to produce huge amounts of wind and solar energy, Texas to create an efficient, go-it-alone electricity market built on gas, coal, nuclear and wind. <strong>But neither could keep the lights on in the face of the type of brutal weather that scientists call a taste of a changing climate.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The weather extremes are the \u201cnew normal\u201d according to some experts. I don\u2019t know if that\u2019s the case, but data suggest it might be. Federal officials have tried to caution the public that climate change will require new approaches to power generation and distribution.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><strong>&#8220;The one common element from the California situation and what appears to be the case in Texas, is weather,&#8221; Richard Glick, chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, told reporters Thursday.<\/strong> &#8220;All the experts tell us this type of wild unanticipated weather is going to happen much more frequently than has happened in the past. It&#8217;s incumbent on us and others to ensure the grid is more resilient against those particular extreme weather events.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>One weather failure turns into another failure, and then another vulnerability in the system is exposed. Failure multiplies and cascades.<\/p>\n<h3>Moments of Failure Multiply<\/h3>\n<p>Our neglected infrastructure cannot handle the uneven use cycles caused by extreme weather and other emergencies.\u00a0<strong>Power supply systems and distribution networks fail under surges of use or sudden drops in production.<\/strong>\u00a0If everyone turns on appliances, especially air conditioning, California\u2019s suppliers and grid cannot meet demand. In Texas, supply dropped rapidly as production went offline (or was already offline) during the late freeze.<\/p>\n<p>Some situations can be predicted, yes, like summers in California or winters in Minnesota. But, a February freeze in Texas is just plain weird. The week before, we were in the 80s and people were using swimming pools. The freeze actually hit as some plants were undergoing routine maintenance before the summer usage spikes. We were not prepared.<\/p>\n<p>One moment of failure. That\u2019s all it took to take down most of Texas\u2019 power grid.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>In an effort to reduce carbon emissions and bring more power generation in-state, California set aggressive renewable targets, increasing the amount of solar capacity on its grid in the past decade to 27 gigawatts in 2019, more than one-third of the nation&#8217;s solar output, according to the Solar Energy Industries Association. And to balance its grid, it&#8217;s helped build an 11-state power market that enables it to export excess solar power during the day and draw in electricity from other sources after sunset.<\/p>\n<p>But August&#8217;s unplanned blackouts \u2014 the state&#8217;s first since the energy crisis of 2000-2001 \u2014 underscored other weaknesses in California&#8217;s grid. A state analysis of the failures that shut off power for 490,000 customers for two hours one night and 320,000 customers for less time another night, pinned blame on the historic West-wide heat wave, which saw demand surge and limited the amount of power California could import from other states. But it also pointed to the state&#8217;s high proportion of renewables, which see their electricity output drop sharply as the sun goes down, requiring other power plants to ramp up quickly \u2014 and which they were unable to do that week.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Like California, Texas suffered from an energy shortage at a key moment<\/strong>: In the space of an hour early Monday morning, 30 gigawatts of generation \u2014 one quarter of the state&#8217;s entire capacity \u2014 dropped off the grid just as a deep freeze drove demand up to levels usually only seen in summer. That led to several days of blackouts affecting 4.4 million Texas customers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>\u201cBlack swan\u201d events will occur and we won\u2019t be prepared. We might prepare for cold snaps and heat waves, yet something else will happen and take down the grids. One small failure will cascade. My fear is that the next failure might be created, such as an act of terrorism.<\/p>\n<h3>Failures will Happen Again<\/h3>\n<p>Yes, I am arguing that people need to realize failures will happen. It\u2019s just not possible to make life 100 percent perfect and utopian. We might do everything \u201cright\u201d and one accident, one act of terrorism, or one natural disaster will take everything offline again.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;First and foremost, we need to recognize, we probably can&#8217;t prevent every outage of this kind that we&#8217;re probably going to be seeing over the next 30 years,&#8221; said Mark Dyson, a principal for electric power with the clean energy think tank Rocky Mount Institute. &#8220;It&#8217;s well past time to recognize a fundamental vulnerability of the power system and take advantage of where we are now with digital technologies, more distributed technology, storage, and flexibility and deal with the root cause and not play whack a mole with these large scale systems.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>We need to do all we can. We need to invest heavily in our infrastructure and realize the blame rests with all of us for not demanding better of elected officials and the power suppliers. We, the citizens and voters and customers, grew complacent. We will be complacent again, sadly, and let this event fade from memory. That seems to be the pattern in California, Texas, and elsewhere.<\/p>\n<p>It is possible to accept that perfection is impossible and demand more reliability.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Public and private failures have struck both California\u2019s and Texas\u2019 power grids in recent years. Why is this? Is this a failure of the marketplace,&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":1533,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"iawp_total_views":8,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[8,10],"tags":[277,278,279,201,280,281,126,282],"class_list":["post-986","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics","category-regulation","tag-california","tag-distribution","tag-electricity","tag-free-market","tag-power-grids","tag-public-utilities","tag-regulation","tag-texas","entry"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/03\/AC_Banner_Gray_1200x630.png?fit=1200%2C630&ssl=1","jetpack-related-posts":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/pfivL7-fU","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/986","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=986"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/986\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1347,"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/986\/revisions\/1347"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1533"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=986"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=986"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.tameri.com\/almostclassical\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=986"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}